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Abstract—Cognitive Radio (CR) technology is a solution to solve the lack of spectrum by allowing the 
secondary user to use licensed bands. There are several potential security challenges for cognitive radio like 
Jamming, PUE and Lion attack. Lion attack is multi layer attacks that has effected on two layers. The Lion 
attack uses PUE or jamming attack in physical layer to disrupt TCP protocol in transport layer. Since 
transport layer is unaware of physical layer situation, when it occurs to an unacknowledged packet, there is 
no way to distinguish between congestion and disconnection in the physical layer. So the windows size of 
TCP would be decrease because of a wrong decision caused by unawareness. To Mitigate the Lion attack 
the cross layer design is usually used to freeze its windows size during frequency handoff. The main issue in 
this solution is finding the best strategy for freezing. In this paper, we propose a dynamic method for 
freezing and performing frequency handoff to counter Lion attack. Also a learning model based on Markov 
decision process (MDP) is applied. By using the proposed method, the secondary user can choose an 
optimal strategy in both physical and transport layers to reduce the effect of Lion attack. 
Keywords-Cross layer, Secondary user, Malicious user, Security, Freeze, Handoff  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Cognitive radio network (CRN) is a new technology that enables the usage of the unused licensed 
spectrum bands [1]. In a cognitive radio network, the unlicensed users (secondary users) are allowed to 
access to the licensed bands on a non-interference basis to legacy spectrum holders (primary users).  
There are several potential attacks on cognitive radio systems. Lion attack, which one of them, can be 
implemented by both jamming and primary user emulation (PUE) attacks to reduce the throughput of 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) by forcing frequency handoffs [2]. In Jamming attack, the malicious 
user intentionally transmits signal in a licensed band and jams the secondary user to reduce the signal to noise 
ratio. The malicious users can run a PUE attack and transmit spurious signals which emulate signals of the 
primary users to prevent the secondary users from accessing the network. 
Lion attack is multi layer attack that uses vulnerabilities in the physical and transport layers to reduce 
throughput of TCP protocol. TCP protocol is used as a fixed technology for wireless and wired networks.  In 
TCP protocol, any losses are assumed to be due to congestion; but this is not true in wireless networks, 
because the wireless links have higher bit error rates compared with wired networks and there are a lot of 
temporary disconnections for frequency handoff. Generally when the TCP acknowledge has not received. 
TCP protocol will assume that there is congestion and thus decrease the window size of transmitter to a 
minimum size. Afterward, the transmitter uses a slow start mechanism to increase the windows size. Thus a 
small number of packets will be sent into the link.  In Lion attack, the attackers use this fact to reduce the 
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throughput of TCP protocol by forcing the secondary user to do frequency handoff through Jamming or PUE 
attacks [1].  
CRNs perform at the physical link layer and target to reduce the throughput of TCP. TCP needs more 
information than those prepared by ISO model to detect this attack. In this paper, a cross-layer architecture is 
used to confront the Lion attack. In the proposed cross layer architecture, the transport layer should be aware 
of physical layer status, to distinguish between congestion and misbehavior there. Meanwhile, we employ 
Markov Decision Process (MDP) as a mathematical framework for modeling the decision-making to find an 
optimal defense strategy against Lion attack. 
There are some solutions to confront this attack. Almost all of them use cross-layer architecture to inform 
TCP layer from the physical layer, it can freeze the windows size of TCP protocol during frequency handoff. 
Although these solutions help to reduce the effects of Lion attack but they don’t pay attention dynamic nature 
of the environment in coordinated attacks. Sometime, the secondary user can stay and freeze the windows 
size because of increasing the number of malicious users. The strategy of the secondary users for performing 
frequency handoff depends on environment parameters like number of the malicious users, the occupation 
probability of the band with primary user. The secondary user must observe the environment and choose a 
strategy for hopping or remaining and transport layer can use freezing or minimizing the window size. These 
decisions are related to status of environment and the secondary user should learn how to do it. In this paper, 
we proposed a learning method to help the secondary user to choose his/her strategy in different situation. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents related works in the literature. In 
section III, the proposed model is described for Lion attack. In section IV, MDP applied to the problem by 
defining states, action, rewards and determining transition probabilities. Analytical results are discussed in 
Section V.  Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, first we review PUE and Jamming attack which are base of the Lion attack, and then 
describe the main lack in the prediction counter attacks of Lion which is missing strategy in finding the 
windows size in TCP. 
In PUE attack, by forcing frequency handoff, the attacker has effects on TCP. In this case, if the attacker 
knows or can guess some of the connection parameters, it can perform a PUE attack by emulating a primary 
transmission at predicted time instants and force the secondary user to make handoff frequency. In PUE 
attack, the malicious users modify the air interface to mimic characteristics of the primary users’ signal. Thus 
the secondary users deem it as the primary users’ signal and leave the band [4]. This attack was first 
introduced by Chan and Park [5]. The main counter attack to PUE is checking the power of signals. In [6], 
the received powers from both primary and malicious users are compared according an analytical model. A 
Bayesian game is applied in [7] to model the received power from both malicious and secondary users. Li 
and Han studied a PUE attack by a Dogfight game in cognitive radio networks in [8-9]. They suggested the 
secondary users must switch to appropriate bands to defend against PUE attack. They derived the optimal 
switching probabilities for both secondary and malicious users can be calculated. 
The Jamming attack is another attack in CRN in which the malicious users interrupt communication 
sessions of the secondary users by making interference. If the interference generated by malicious users is 
high enough, they can substantially reduce the communication performance or even completely block the 
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secondary users [11]. Frequency hopping is an useful and simple defense method, proposed for defending 
against the Jamming attack, in multichannel CRNs [12]. A Markov Decision Process (MDP) model is also 
proposed as a countermeasure for Jamming attacks in [13].   
The Lion attack is an attack which was introduced by Hern in [1]. In Lion attack, the attacker use PUE or 
Jamming to cause delay in physical layer result in decreasing windows size of TCP. There are several 
methods to prevent the Lion attacks. Le et.al [18] introduced a cross layer design by using a mobility 
detection element in the network layer that informs the transport layer to optimize TCP operations. TCP-
Feedback has proposed in [19] to help the TCP sender distinguish between losses due to routes failure and 
network congestion. TCP-freeze is proposed in [20] to fit the windows size when there is no congestion. In 
this method the receiver informs the sender about situation of physical layer by sending ZWP signal. This 
approach is not suitable in dynamic environment, such as CRN, where their parameters have effect on the 
environment. In this situation, the secondary user finds and applies the best strategy against the malicious 
users.  
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
Suppose there is a network with M spectrum bands and one secondary user who tries to access the 
network. Based on IEEE 802.22, the secondary user can send information when the primary users are absent 
[10]. 
ON OFF
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Figure (1).the access pattern of the primary users  
 
The access pattern of primary users is presented by ON-OFF model as shown in Figure (1), in which 
switching from ON and OFF with transition probabilities α and β [5]. The primary user’s band is time slotted. 
 and   are assumed to be the same in all bands for simplicity. The occupation probability of the band with 
the primary user is PBP  that is determined by Equation (1). PIP can be defined by Equation (2) and represents 
the probability that the band not being occupied by the primary user. 


+
=PBP       (1) 


+
=PIP        (2) 
Meanwhile, we suppose there are m  malicious users that want to disrupt the performance of transport 
layer for that secondary user. The secondary user must sense the band at the beginning of  the time slot to be 
sure that the primary user is absent. The primary users can send the information in any time slot, they want. 
As stated previously, the malicious users want to disturb communication of the secondary user. Thus, they 
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wait at the beginning of time slot and sense the band to access it. If the secondary user was using the band, 
the malicious user would send destructive signals to destroy ACK packets. 
The malicious users cooperate with each other to increase their damage on the network. It is supposed that 
malicious users are managed so as preventing the entrance to same band by two malicious at the same time 
slot. In this situation, the malicious users can occupy m bands in each time slot. The strategy of the malicious 
users is considered simple that is randomly switching the other bands to find the secondary user. 
We propose a learning method to find the best action for secondary users. Due to need for the information 
of other layers, we use cross layer design. 
Regarding the cross layer design, we assumed that the transport layer is aware of the physical layer and act 
based on status of the physical layer. Figure (2) depicts the general architecture used in the proposed model. 
Physical Layer
Application layer
Presentation layer
Session Layer
Transport Layer
Network Layer
Data Link Layer
Actions 
MDP Base learning
States Observe 
 
Figure (2). The architecture of proposed model 
IV. MDP BASED STRATEGY FOR PROPOSED MODEL 
 MDP is a stochastic process that models dynamics of the environment under different actions. It is a 
framework for representing complex multi-stage decision problems. MDP is a five-tuple ,,,, RPAS , 
where S is the set of states, A is the set of actions, ),|(
' assP  is the state transition probability, 
),,( ' sasR denotes the immediate reward values and   represents the discount factor which 
satisfies 10   . In this section, the MDP model for Lion attack is explained. 
A. States 
We suppose four states to model lion attack, namely: P , L , H and k . The state of the band denoted P , 
when the primary network is present in the band. In state P , the secondary user can’t send information and 
should wait until end of the time slot to find an unused band. State L denotes the situation in which there is 
a malicious and a secondary user in the same band in absence of any primary user, results in establishing the 
Lion attack by malicious user. State H denotes the state in which the secondary user can’t receive the ACK 
package due to the high traffic of receiver. State k is considered for the secondary user sends information 
successfully in absence of both primary and malicious users. ,...3,2,1=k is a consecutive slot with successful 
transmission. 
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B. Actions  
The set of actions are }HFSF,HT,ST,{=A . The secondary user uses four different bisection strategies to 
defend against the Lion attack. The first part of strategies is related to physical layer and the second part is 
regard to transport layer. In each time slot, the secondary user decide whether to stay in band ( S ) or hop to 
another band ( H ).  
Moreover, for increasing performance of the transport layer, the window size after each successful 
transmission doubles (maximum K times); and according to TCP protocol the window size will be 
minimized when a heavy traffic occurs in the receiver, abbreviated by T . TCP protocol can use freeze 
algorithm to enhance throughput of the TCP protocol by fixing the window size during the congestion. The 
freeze algorithm is abbreviated by F . 
In Figure (3), two actions ST and HT  are defined for states k and H. The first part of actions is to stay in 
its band or hop to other band. The second part of action (T) doubles the windows size for state k and 
minimizes the windows size for state H. Two actions SF and HF  are shown in Figure (4). Similarly, the 
first part of actions here is to stay in its band or hop from its band. The second part of actions is F which 
freezes the widow size for both states H and L . Figures (3) and (4) illustrate the effect of these actions on 
transition of states. 
1 2 3 k-1 k
….
P L H
….
 
Figure (3).the effect of two actions ST  and HT on the transition of states 
1 2 3 k-1 k
P L H
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Figure (4).the effect of two actions SF  and HF on the transition of states 
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C. Rewards 
The secondary user receives reward and penalty for each transition. sC  is defined as the cost of sensing 
the primary users at the beginning of each time slot for the secondary user. If the secondary user wants to 
hop to another band, it has to change its antenna parameters and spend some energy which would incur 
additional costs for hopping ( hC ). If the secondary user sends its information and the malicious users 
disrupt ACK package, the secondary user would lost LC . When traffic of the network is heavy, the 
secondary users have HC  penalty for unsuccessful transmission. At the end, it will get the gain G  when the 
secondary user sends its information successfully.  
Taking into account the above mentioned costs and gain, rewards of the proposed model have been we 
calculated. When state of the band changes from s to 's by performing action a , the reward is ),,( ' assR . The 
rewards to go to state k from different states by performing action ST are listed in Equation (3). 
=−−=
=−−=
=−=
=−=+
1,...,k  CLSTHkR
1,...,k  CLSTLkR
1,...,k  CSTPkR
1,...,k  CGSTkkR
sH
sL
s
s
),,(
),,(
),,(
),1,(
(3) 
Equation (4) shows the reward to go to state H  from different states to state H with action ST . 
s
Ls
s
H
CGSTHR
LCSTLHR
CSTPHR
LsCSTHHR
−=
−−=
−=
−−=
),1,(
),,(
),,(
),,(
(4) 
    It is simple to calculate the expected reward for action HT according to Equation (5): 
  
 
 
(5) 
Equation (6) gives the expected reward for action SF . 
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(6) 
And finally, Equation (7) presents the reward for action HF . 
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(7) 
D. Transtition Probabilities 
In this section, the transition probabilities are shown for different actions. Parameter  is defined as the 
mean of the exponential distribution for heavy traffic arrival. )(kf L is the probability of occurring Lion attack 
that is calculated as follows: 
    
otherwise                       1
m
M
k            
kmM
m
kf L





−
−=
1
)(  
 
(8) 
Equation (9) provides the transition probabilities for action ST . 
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(9) 
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The transition probabilities for action HT are shown in Equation (10): 
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(10) 
Action SF  has the following transition probabilities:  
),|(),|(),|(1),|1(
)()1()1(),|(
)1(),|(
),|(
),|(),|(),|(1),|1(
)()1(),|(
),|(
1),|(
SFLHpSFLLpSFLPpSFLp
M
m
 SFLLp
 SFLHp
 SFLPp
SFPLpSFPHpSFPPp SFPp
M
m
 SFPLp
 SFPHp
 SFPPp
−−−=
−−=
−=
=
−−−=
−=
=
−=






 
 
 
(11) 
Finally, the transition probabilities for action HF  can be obtained from Equation (12): 
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E. Solving Markov decision process 
The proposed model helps the secondary user to choose the best action in each state. MDP doesn’t pay 
attention to the expected reward but increases the long time reward for each state. The best action for each 
state can be calculated from Bellman Equations. 








+= 

'
)(),,(),,(arg:)( '''
,,,
s
HFSFHTSTa
sVsasRsaspmax s  (13) 
There are several learning methods for MDP like value iteration algorithm. Output of the value iteration 
algorithm is an appropriate action in each state. Figure (5) depicts learning method for the suggested MDP. 
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Figure (5). The algorithm of proposed model 
V. ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the analytical results derived from the proposed model are presented. We will discuss the 
effects of changing the amounts of m,   and α, on the optimal strategies. When the secondary users has a 
constant traffic (like TV channels), change in the amounts of   and α does not mean. But there are some 
networks such as WiMAX in which many kinds of traffics such as http, voice, and movie are existed.  
Different kinds of traffics in a network lead to the different amounts of   and α. For example, when a 
primary user sends a real-time video by a WiMAX network, it uses the network continuously. But when he 
changes its traffic and sends a voice data, he/she probably finishes his/her communication sooner. So, if a 
user changes his traffic of real-time video into voice data, the amount of α will increase. We can exemplify 
changing the amount of   with similar examples. The change in the amounts of   and α result in different 
 10 
optimal strategies for the secondary user. So, we have discussed effects of increasing and decreasing in the 
amounts of   and α on the optimal strategies that is useful for the changing-traffic networks. The initial 
values for parameters are assumed as follows: ,20=m  ,100=M  ,2=sC  ,10=LC  ,20=HC  ,2=hC  .50=G    
Table (1) and Figure (6) show the optimal strategies for the states H, P, L and k versus α while  and   
are fixed and equal to 0.5 and 0.1 respectively. The results show higher  cause the secondary user in the 
state P  will prefer to stay in its band, while in the states H, L and k, the secondary user prefers to hop. 
 
Figure (6). The optimal time slot for switching versus α 
It is clear that only for the state P , both secondary and primary users are in a same band. However, in the 
other states namely L , H  and k , there is no primary users are absent in the bands occupied by the 
secondary users’ band. According to the figure (1), in states k , H and L , the changes of  do not have any 
effect on the probability of occupying the band with a primary user ( PBP ) because   is constant. Although 
for other bands, increasing   will decrease PBP (


+
=PBP ). Thus in states K , H and P , decreasing PBP  for 
other bands increases the secondary user’s incentive for switching. 
TABLE (1). The optimal action for secondary user versus α 
Transition 
probability 
The optimal strategy in physical layer The optimal strategy in transport layer 
α 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
0.1 Hopping  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.2 Hopping  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.3 Hopping  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.4 Hopping  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.5 Hopping  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.6 Staying  Staying  Staying  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.7 Staying  Hopping  Hopping  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.8 Staying  Hopping  Hopping  Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.9 Staying  Hopping  Hopping  Freezing Freezing TCP 
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In state P , increasing  causes the primary users leave the band with high probability as illustrated by 
Figure (1). Thus for the state P , increasing  leads to decrease PBP  for the secondary user’s band and 
consequently, the secondary user will prefer to stay in its band. 
Both Table (2) and Figure (7) show the optimal strategies for the states k , L , H  and P  versus   while 
 and  are fixed and equal 0.5 and 0.1 respectively. The effects of changing  on the optimal strategies 
are exactly same as the effects of changing . The results show that by increasing α, the secondary user in 
state P  would prefer to remain in its band; and in the other state, the secondary user would prefer to hop. 
In state P , increasing  , doesn’t have any effect on occupation probability of the secondary users’ band 
with the primary users ( PBP ) but the occupation probabilities of other bands will be increased (


+
=PIP ). 
As a result, by increasing  , the secondary user prefers to stay in its band. 
 
Figure (7). The optimal time slot for switching versus β 
TABLE (2). The optimal action for secondary user versus β 
Transition probability The optimal strategy in physical layer The optimal strategy in transport layer 
β 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
0.1 Hopping Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.2 Hopping Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.3 Hopping Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.4 Hopping Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.5 Hopping Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.6 Staying   Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.7 Staying   Staying   Staying   Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.8 Staying   Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.9 Staying   Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
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In states L , H and k , the primary user doesn’t exist in the secondary user’s band. Figure (1) shows that in 
states L , H  and k , increasing   results in increasing the occupation probability of the secondary user’s 
band in the next time slot, thus the secondary user prefers to hop from its band. 
In state P, increasing  does not change the amount of PBP , but increasing  result in decreasing PBP  for 
the secondary’s band. So as table (3) shows the secondary user prefers to stay in its band. Conversely, 
simultaneous increase for both  and  increases PBP  for the band in the states k, H and L. So it is rational 
for the secondary user to switch to other bands in those states. Table (3) and figure (8) show this fact clearly.
   
 
Figure (8). The optimal time slot for switching versus α and β  
TABLE (3). The optimal action for secondary user versus β and α  
Transition 
probability 
The optimal strategy in physical 
layer 
The optimal strategy in 
transport layer 
α β 
Primary 
user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
Primary 
user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
0.1 0.1 Hopping Staying Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.2 0.2 Hopping Staying Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.3 0.3 Hopping Staying Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.4 0.4 Hopping Staying Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.5 0.5 Hopping Staying Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.6 0.6 Staying Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.7 0.7 Staying Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.8 0.8 Staying Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.9 0.9 Staying Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
The effect of increasing  and decreasing   on the optimal strategies is studied in the rest of this section.  
Increasing  decreases PBP  but changes in  does not affect it. Also increase in   and decrease in    result 
in decreasing )(


+
=PBPB PP for other bands. Although PBP  decreases for both secondary’s band and other 
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bands but the amount of change in PBP  for the secondary is lower than the other bands. This matter causes 
that the secondary prefers to switch to other bands and it is shown in table (4). 
Similarly, for the states k, H and L, increase in   and decrease in  result in decreasing PBP for both the 
secondary’s band and other bands. Table (4) and figure (9) show that the secondary prefer to switch to other 
bands because of more decrease in PBP  of other bands. 
  
Figure (9). The optimal time slot for switching for different values of α and β  
TABLE (4). The optimal action for secondary user for different value of  and   
Transition 
probability 
The optimal strategy in physical 
layer 
The optimal strategy in transport 
layer 
α β 
Primary 
user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
Primary 
user is 
present 
Lion attack 
High 
Traffic 
0.1 0.9 Hopping Hopping Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.2 0.8 Hopping Hopping Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.3 0.7 Hopping Hopping Staying Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.4 0.6 Hopping Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.5 0.5 Hopping Hopping Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.6 0.4 Staying Staying Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.7 0.3 Staying Staying Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.8 0.2 Staying Staying Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
0.9 0.1 Staying Staying Hopping Freezing Freezing TCP 
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Figure (10) demonstrates that increasing the number of the malicious users, which results in more quickly 
switch to the secondary user to the state k . In states k , if the secondary user stays in its bands, the risk of 
attack is raised by increasing m . Thus the secondary user is better to switch as soon as possible. 
Table (5) shows that the number of malicious users doesn’t have any effects on the optimal strategy of 
the secondary user’s in states L , H  and P . On the other hand, in state H , it can be inferred from Equations 
(10) and (11) that the probability of being attacked in the next slot by opting action HT ( ),|( tcphHLp − ) 
or by selecting action  ST ( ),|( tcpsHLp − ) has direct relationship with m  for the secondary user. Thus, 
increasing m  will equally increase the attack probability for two strategies of staying and hopping that lead 
to the strategies of the secondary users don’t change. A similar reasoning is true for states L and P . 
 
Figure (10). The optimal time slot for switching versus the number of malicious users 
Table (5). The optimal action for switching versus the number of malicious users 
Number of malicious 
users 
The optimal strategy in physical layer 
The optimal strategy in transport 
layer 
M 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
Primary user is 
present 
Lion 
attack 
High 
Traffic 
5 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
10 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
15 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
20 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
25 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
30 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
35 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
40 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
45 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
50 Hoping Staying Staying Freezing TCP TCP 
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I. CONCLUSIONS 
Lion attack is a multi layer attack that targets the performance of CRN try to decrease TCP connections 
with an opportunistic Jamming and PUE attacks.  
This paper has proposed an MDP based learning algorithm for finding the best strategies in defends against 
Lion attack. We assume that the transport layer is aware of the physical layer’s information. In such 
situation the main issue is selection of the appropriate strategy by both transport and physical layers. In the 
proposed method, the physical layer performs handoff frequency and selects either to switch or stay, while 
the transport layer can choose to freeze or decrease or double the length of windows size. Analytical results 
are discussed to find the effects of primary user behavior and the number of the malicious users, on the 
optimal action for the secondary user. The results show that, to increase its payoff, by increasing transition 
probabilities α and β, the secondary user in state P , should stay in its band; and in the other state, the 
secondary user should hop. By increasing the number of malicious users, in states k ,  the secondary user 
should switch as soon as possible to increase its payoff, while in states L , H  and P  it doesn’t affect on the 
secondary user’s optimal strategy. Future works can concentrate on implementation of the proposed model 
in OSI with more details and the information of data link layer can be used in cross layer design to have 
optimal strategy in upper layers. Also, POMDP (Partially Observable Markov Decision Process) can be 
used when the information of lower layer like physical layer isn’t complete       
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